

OPERATION ACTIVE RESOLVE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY D8

1 General Information

This intelligence summary covers the last 24 hours (From D8).

2 Intelligence

2.1 Air

2.1.1 Syrian Air Force moving jets out of TABQA

Recent reporting and imagery indicate that Syrian Air Force have moved their operational jets from TABQA by road to a undisclosed airfield. VID satellite imagery during D8 captured this picture from TABQA showing. Reporting indicate that the moving process have taken place for the last 48 hours and is now completed.

Imagery: Imagry from TABQA during D8

ASSESSMENT:

It is LIKELY that all functioning jets at TABQA have been moved to a undisclosed airfield. It is EVEN CHANCE that there are still jets undergoing repairs at TABQA. It is LIKELY that TABQA remains an important airfield for the Syrian Airforce and that they will make an attempt to secure the airfield at a later stage. It is HIGHLY LIKELY that any such attempt will be secured by a very robust IADS package to support and protect the airfield. VID assess it as HIGHLY LIKELY that TABQA is a important airfield to support A-G operations in the northern part of Syria and that the abandonment of the airfield is a temporary attempt to save combat power to be used in future attempts. It is EVEN CHANCE that SAMs currently located at TABQA will be moved to a new airfield.

DISCLAIMER:

2.2 Sea

2.2.1 Port Tartus - Ships departed

A SOCC recon team at Port Tartus have reported that all ships reported on D4 left port during D8.

COMMENT:

SOCC have reported three ships in Tartus on D4. See SOCC INTREP D4

ASSESSMENT:

It is LIKELY that the ships departing Tartus is participating in the planned exercise between Russia and China in the EMED (see <u>VID INTSUM D4</u>, <u>section 2.3.1 and 2.3.2</u>). It is possible that the departing ships are linked to a unknown Russian-Chinese activity (See <u>VID INTSUM D6</u>, <u>section 2.4.1</u>)

2.3 Ground

2.3.1 IADS Sector EAST technical issues during transfer of SCC

Credible reporting indicates that the Syrian forces were during D8 transferring duties from their primary SCC to a backup SCC. Reporting indicates this taking place due to several strikes at TABQA and reporting indicate that the assessments from Syrian General Staff were that TABQA is still a target. Also see section <u>2.1.1</u> about removal of aircrafts from TABQA.

ASSESSMENT:

It is LIKELY that IADS Sector EAST have moved their SCC to an alternate location. EVEN CHANCE that SCC now is at TIYAS or PALMYRA.

2.3.2 SA-2 launchers from Ragga vehicle factory (SYTGT022)

VID reporting indicate that since the outset of the was, Raqqa vehicle factory have tripled their output of producing SA-2 launchers. The current production consists of 6 production lines. Credible reporting saw 6x launchers leaving SA-2 Raqqa factory at the end of D6.

ASSESSMENT:

VID assess it as LIKELY that Raqqa vehicle factory are able to produce a SA-2 launcher in 6 days. It is LIKELY that the 6 launchers will be taken to a new site and combined with an SA-2 radar produced at Damascus West (SYTGT026)

2.3.3 Production at Damascus North increased (SYTGT027)

VID reporting indicate a massive production increase at Damascus North (SYTGT027). The factory has since the start of the day campaign increased its production to 11 production lines (DPI 1-4, 6-12). Sources reported 4 SA-6 launchers left the factory at the evening of D6. Credible reporting also indicate vehicles for 2x SA-11 batteries were completed during D8 and left the factory on during the late evening of D8.

DISCLAIMER:

ASSESSMENT:

Based on the sources VID assess it as LIKELY that Damascus North is able to produce enough SA-6 launchers for a BN every 6 days. It is also LIKELY that the factories are able to produce enough vehicles for two SA-11 Batteries every 8 days.

2.3.4 Production at Damascus West increased (SYTGT026)

VID sources reported a SA-2 Search radar was detected leaving Damascus West factory (SYTGT026) on D5. The next day (D6) a P19 Search radar was observed leaving. The following day (D7) a SA-6 Search radar left the factory. Finally on VID received reporting that on D8 a EWR were completed and left the factory. Credible reporting indicate that the factory is now running at full capacity.

ASSESSMENT:

Based on the reporting it is assessed as HIGLLY LIKELY that Damascus West have 4 production lines and are producing radars. VID assess it as LIKELY that the factory will use the following amount of time to produce one radar:

SA-2 SR: 5 days P19 SR: 6 days SA-6 SR: 7 days EWR: 8 days.

2.3.5 SA-15s from Tartus Vehicle factory (SYTGT021)

VID have now reporting on the production from Tartus vehicle factory (SYTGT021). The factory is currently running 4 production lines all producing SA-15 vehicles. Earlier reporting about 8 SA-15s in final stages of production (Reference: VID INTSUM D3 - Section 2.2.2.) was correct but was a delay caused by a lack of parts. The logistical chain have been restored and parts are arriving normally to the factory, so the factory is now running at full capacity.

Credible reporting have 8x SA-15s from the delayed production left the factory on D7 and were headed to Syrian Air Defence Academy (SYTGT021) for final certification before deployment into the field.

ASSESSMENT:

Based on reporting VID assess it as HIGHLY LIKELY that Tartus Vehicle factory (SYTGT021) are using 7 days to produce 4x SA-15 launchers. With 8 launchers leaving the factory on D7 (4 x delayed production + 4 normal production), VID assess it as LIKELY that new SA-15s will be available from Tartus Vehicle factory on D14.

2.3.6 Syrian 6th Corps mobilization order

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command have issues a general mobilization order to start mobilizing the 6th Corps.

ASSESSMENT:

It is HIGHLY LIKELY that the Syrian leadership now understands that they have overplayed their position with the invasion into Turkey.

2.4 Political

2.4.1 Russian reaction to downing of SU-27

During D8 a SU-27 was engaged and downed by allied assets outside Bassel Al Assad. Russia have condemned the action, and statements indicate this is a pattern from the allied forces. Russian officials have stated that this unprovoked aggression will have consequences.

COMMENT:

A SU-24 was downed on D3. See VID INTSUM D3, section 2.5.2

ASSESSMENT:

Russia has now significant assets available in the theater and have many options for escalating the situation or take action to revenge the downed SU-27. It is assessed as HIGHLY LIKELY that Russia will take kinetic action to revenge the downed Russian jets. VID have no firm reporting on what Russia will conduct. It is assessed as LIKELY that Russia has pre-planned actions that LIKELY are rehearsed, either partially or in full, that can be executed on short notice.

3 VID Intelligence gaps

- VID_IR_1: What is the Syrian readiness for conducting attacks with WMD?
- VID_IR_2: What is the status and disposition of Syrian SCUD units?
- VID_IR_3: What is the status and disposition of Syrian Naval units?
- VID_IR_4: What is the status of Syrian Air Force
 - DCA missions? (Does the Syrian Air Force fly CAPs?)
 - QRA (reaction times?, from what bases? type of aircrafts?)
- VID IR 5: What is the status of Syrian Air Force A-G missions?
- VID_IR_6: Is there presence of Russian forces in either Tartus or Bassel Al-Assad airfield?
- VID IR 7: What is the status of Syrian IADS?
 - Positions of EWR
 - Position of SAM sites
 - o Is the entire IADS operational?
- VID IR 8: Are Russian aircraft moving into bases in Egypt?
 - O What type of aircraft?
 - How do Russian aircraft operate out from Egypt?
 - VID IR 9: How will Russia and Syria enforce embargo?
 - O What are the sources of the attack against logistics ship?
 - O What assets can be used for blockade of allied ships?
- VID IR_10: Where will 5th Corps deploy to?
- VID IR_11: What is status and disposition of Syrian 6th Corps
 - What are the composition of 6th Corps
 - How long until 6th Corps are combat ready
- VID IR 12: What is composition of Chinese SAG?
- VID IR 13: What is composition of Russian SAG?
- VID IR_14: What is the unknown Russian-Chinese activity?1

¹ VID INTSUM D6, section 2.4.1